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ABSTRACT
Obtaining the state of the art performance of deep learning models
imposes a high cost to model generators, due to the tedious data
preparation and the substantial processing requirements. To pro-
tect the model from unauthorized re-distribution, watermarking
approaches have been introduced in the past couple of years. e
watermark allows the legitimate owner to detect copyright viola-
tions of their model. We investigate the robustness and reliability
of state-of-the-art deep neural network watermarking schemes. We
focus on backdoor-based watermarking and show that an adversary
can remove the watermark fully by just relying on public data and
without any access to the model’s sensitive information such as the
training data set, the trigger set or the model parameters. We as
well prove the security inadequacy of the backdoor-based water-
marking in keeping the watermark hidden by proposing an aack
that detects whether a model contains a watermark.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks(DNNs) have been successfully deployed in
various applications; ranging from speech [14, 17, 19] and image
[18, 22, 35] recognition to natural language processing [2, 12, 13, 36]
and more. e task of generating a model in deep neural network is
computationally expensive and also requires a considerable amount
of training data that has undergone a thorough process of prepara-
tion and labelling. e task of data cleaning is known to be the most
time consuming task in data science [32]. According to the 2016
data science report, conducted by CrowdFlower, provider of a “data
enrichment” platform for data scientists, reveals that data scientists
spend around 80% of their time on just preparing and managing
data for analysis [9]. is enormous investment on preparing the
data and training a model on it is however at an immediate risk,
since the model can be easily copied and redistributed once sold. To
protect the model from unauthorized re-distribution, watermark-
ing approaches have been introduced, inspired by wide deploy-
ment of watermarks in multimedia [23, 34, 37] to provide copyright
protection. Watermarking approaches for DNNs lie in two broad
categories: white-box and black-box watermarking. Black-box wa-
termarking does not suer from the application limitations of white-
box watermarking; as in the former verication only requires API
access to the plagiarized service to verify the ownership of the deep
learning model, while the laer requires model owners to access all
the parameters of models in order to extract the watermark. Fur-
thermore, black-box watermarking is advantageous over white-box
watermarking as it is more likely to be resilient against statistical
aacks [38]. In this work1, we investigate recent black-box water-
marking approaches proposed in [1, 16, 44], these approaches each
introduce a(some) variant(s) of backdoor-based watermarking to
protect model ownership. Backdoors or neural trojans, [7, 15, 26],
originally are the terms for a class of aacks against the security
of deep learning when an entity outsources the learning for model
computation to another untrusted but resourceful party. e party
can train a model that performs well on the requested task, while
its embedded backdoors lead to targeted misclassications when
encountering a particular trigger in the input. e idea of “turning
weakness to a strength” [1], launched a new line of work suggesting
1Our code is publicly available at [redacted for review]
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using backdoors for ownership protection([1, 16, 44]). e motiva-
tion behind the research on this topic is to use the trigger to embed
a “signature” of the model owner, as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: A schematic illustration of the backdoor-based wa-
termarking in neural networks
e trigger in the input can take one of the following forms:
embedded content representing a logo of the owner([44] and [16]),
a pre-dened noise paern in the inputs([44]) or a set of particular
inputs acting as a secret “key” set([44] and [1]). We investigate
whether using backdoors in DNNs brings sucient “strength” for
watermarking the models. We introduce two aacks(black-box and
white-box) on the aforementioned backdoor-based watermarking
schemes, and show that these watermarks are fully removable. Our
aacks neither require any information of the original data and its
corresponding ground truth labels utilized for training the water-
marked model, nor need to have any information of the backdoor
embedded in the model. Our work sheds more light on the problem
of model stealing and insuciency of the proposed solutions. Our
results imply that, an aacker can steal a model that is trained by
a resourceful party and remove the watermark without losing the
models prociency or any need to undergo an extensive eort of
data preparation as the watermarked model has to endure.
Our Contributions- We propose three main contributions in
this work: (i) We introduce our black-box aack that removes the
embedded watermark in backdoor-based watermarking scheme.
Our aack solely relies on publicly available information and suc-
cessfully removes the watermark from the neural network without
requiring any access to the network parameters, the backdoor em-
bedded as the watermark, or the training data. (ii) We present a
white-box aack for scenarios that we are guaranteed access to
the model parameters. Beneting from the additional information,
our white-box aack oers an optimized version of the black-box
aack, where the optimization both improves the model accuracy
and signicantly decreases the aack’s timing. (iii) We as well
present our property inference aack that fully distinguishes the
watermarked neural networks from the unmarked ones. Our aack
breaks a security property of watermarked models by detecting the
presence of watermarks in the models, and in combination with
the proposed two aacks provides an aacker with a powerful tool
to remove the the watermarks completely and eciently.
Paper Organization- e rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: we review state-of-the-art watermarking schemes for DNNs
and the proposed aacks on the schemes in Section 2. We provide
formal denitions for deep neural networks and backdoor-based
watermarking in Section 3 in addition to describing the security vul-
nerability in the schemes. Subsequently in Section 4, we introduce
the basic and optimized versions of our aack that removes the
watermark. We as well propose an aack that detects the presence
of a watermark in a given model. Finally in Section 5, we present
the results of the experiments that conrm a successful watermark
removal.
2 RELATEDWORK
e rst watermarking framework for deep neural networks was
introduced by Uchida et al. [40]. ey propose a white-box water-
marking by embedding watermark into the parameters of the DNN
model during the training process. Recently, by analyzing the statis-
tical distribution of the model in [40], Wang and Kerschbaum [38]
presented an aack that detects the watermark and removes it by
overwriting. In another watermarking aempt in white-box seing,
DeepMarks [4] embeds a binary code-vector in the probabilistic
distribution of the weights while preserving accuracy. However,
in addition to being susceptible to statistical aacks, white-box
watermarking methods [4, 29, 40], might suer from application
constraints. ese methods presume access to all the model pa-
rameters, which is not guaranteed in all cases. e presumption
prevents the model owner from claiming ownership of their stolen
model, if the parameters of the redistributed model are not publicly
available.
e demand in protecting neural networks that are solely accessible
through a remote API, has made a tangible shi in DNN watermark-
ing research as well [5]. DeepSigns framework [33] which embeds
watermark in the probability density function of the activation set
of the target layer, introduces two versions of the framework to
provide watermarking in both white-box and black-box seing. In
two other approaches [6, 28], the authors use adversarial examples
in a zero-bit watermarking algorithm to enable extraction of the
watermark without requiring model parameters. is approach
however, requires limitation on transferability of the utilized ad-
versarial examples across other networks.
Backdoor-based watermarking, proposed in [1, 16, 24, 30, 44] is an-
other recent line of work that aims at watermarking DNN models
in the black-box seing. In this approach, a secret trigger set and
its pre-dened labels are fed to the model during training process.
Relying on the model’s ability to learn these arbitrary key pairs of
triggers and their corresponding labels, the model owner can prove
their ownership and protect the model’s copyright.
Since backdooring a neural network may also impose other
threats, identifying and removing them has gained aention in re-
search. However, typically such systems as presented in [8, 11, 27]
are intended to be employed alongside the neural network in pro-
duction. ey are tasked only to fend o aempts of actively using
the embedded backdoor, which is not applicable for the scenario of
aacking watermarking schemes because the trigger set is never
released. On the other hand, there are few schemes[41] that does
not require access to the trigger set at any time. ey rst detect
whether a backdoor exists in the model by checking how many
pixels in the input image should be modied for the prediction to
change to another class. When there is one such consistent small
modication for many benign inputs, it is assumed to be a backdoor
and then the authors proceed to reverse-engineer and mitigate it.
is approach only works with backdoors that are restricted to
a relatively small patch of the image. Nonetheless, we propose
aacks that fully remove these embedded watermarks, which are
inspired by model stealing aacks in DNNs. Recent works on steal-
ing machine learning models via prediction APIs have shown that
the current ML-as-a-service providers could enable aacks that
extract the model and violate the training data privacy; Papernot
et al. [31] exhibit this aack on specic models, Tamer et al. [39]
exploit this vulnerability to target transferability of a specic type
of adversarial examples, and Juuti et al. [21] demonstrates how to
ease the model extraction by proposing more eective aacks. To
the best of our knowledge, there is only one other model stealing
aack proposed to remove the watermark [20]. Authors in [20]
propose evasion aacks which steals n models and answers the
prediction queries with the class that receives the majority of votes
from the stolen networks, resulting in watermark removal. How-
ever, in our work, we introduce aacks that break the security of
proposed watermarking schemes without the need to access multi-
ple models. We elaborate on how our aacks successfully remove
the watermark while maintaining the accuracy of the models, aer
describing backdoor-based watermarking schemes in details in the
next section.
3 BACKDOOR-BASEDWATERMARKING
e intuition in black-box watermarking is to explore the general-
ization and memorization capabilities of deep neural networks to
learn the paerns of an embedded trigger set and its pre-dened
label(s). e pairs of learned paerns and their corresponding pre-
dictions will act as the keys for the ownership verication. Zhang et
al. [44] investigate three watermark generation algorithms to gen-
erate dierent types of trigger sets for deep neural network models:
(a) embedding meaningful content into the original training data,
(b) embedding noise as watermarks into the protected DNNs, and (c)
embedding irrelevant data samples. Guo and Potkonjak [16] as well,
propose a content embedding approach for watermarking in DNNs.
Moreover, similar to the third watermark generation algorithm in
[44], Adi et al. [1] suggest using the over-parameterization of neural
networks to make a backdoor in it. Backdooring enables the oper-
ator to train a model that deliberately outputs specic(incorrect)
labels; authors in [1] use this property to design trigger sets to
watermark the DNN. In what follows, we provide a formal de-
nition for learning process in neural networks, we also formally
describe backdoor-based watermarking in DNN and elaborate on
the schemes introduced in [1, 16, 44]. We end the section by point-
ing out the security vulnerabilities of the schemes.
3.1 Denitions and Models
We follow the notations of [1] throughout this paper to introduce
our aack accordingly. In order to train a neural network, we
initially require some objective ground-truth function f . e neural
network consists of two algorithms: training and classication. In
training, the network tries to learn the closest approximation of
f . Later, during the classication phase the network utilizes this
approximation to perform prediction on unseen data. Formally,
Figure 2: A high-level schematic illustration of the learning
process
the input to the neural network is represented by a set of binary
strings: D ⊆ {0, 1}∗, where |D | = Θ(2n ), with n indicating the
security parameter. e corresponding labels are represented by
L ∈ {0, 1}∗⋃{⊥} and |L| = Ω(p(n)) for a positive polynomial
p(.); with the symbol ⊥ showing the undened classication for
a specic input. e ground-truth function f : D → L, assigns
labels to inputs. Also, for D¯ the set of inputs with dened ground-
truth labels, D¯ = {x ∈ D | f (x) , ⊥}, the algorithms’ access to
f is granted through an oracle Of . Hence, the learning process
illustrated in Fig. 2 of [1], consists of the following two algorithms:
• Train(Of ): a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that
outputs a model M ⊆ {0, 1}p(n)
• Classify(M,x ): a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
that outputs a label M(x) ∈ L\{⊥} for each input x ∈ D
e metric ϵ−accuracy evaluates the accuracy of the algorithm pair
(Train, Classify). In an ϵ−accurate algorithm the following inequal-
ity holds: Pr [f (x) , Classi f y(M,x)|x ∈ D¯] ≤ ϵ ; the probability is
taken over the randomness of Train, with the assumption that the
ground-truth label is available for those inputs.
3.2 Backdoor-based Watermarking in DNNs
Backdooring teaches the machine learning model to output in-
correct but valid labels TL : T → L\{⊥};x 7→ TL(x) , f (x)
to a particular subset of inputs T ⊆ D, namely trigger set. e
pair b = (T ,TL) forms the backdoor for a model. A random-
ized algorithm called SampleBackdoor generates the backdoors b.
SampleBackdoor needs access to the oracle Of and works closely
with the original model. e complete backdooring process is illus-
trated in Fig.3 [1].
Formally presenting, backdoor(Of ,b,M) is a PPT algorithm that
on input oracle to f , the backdoor b and a model M , outputs a
model Mˆ . e backdoor model Mˆ is required to output particular
incorrect(regarding f ) labels for the inputs from the trigger set and
correct ones for other inputs. In other words, the following two
inequalities must always hold for a backdoored model Mˆ :
• Prx ∈D¯\T 2 [f (x) , Classi f y(Mˆ,x)] ≤ ϵ
• Prx ∈T [TL(x) , Classi f y(Mˆ,x)] ≤ ϵ
2From thi point on, we assume D¯ = D , without loss of generality
Figure 3: A schematic illustration of the backdooring pro-
cess
To watermark an ML model using the backdooring process, the
algorithm MModel() is used. MModel consists of the following
sub-algorithms:
(1) Generate M ← Train(Of ): Generates the original model
on the training set, not that the trigger set is not included
in training in this step.
(2) Sample (mk,vk)← KeyGen(): e watermarking schemes
commits to the embedded backdoors b and generates mark-
ing and verication keys from b. Since the details of gen-
eratingmk,vk has no aect on our aack, we leave them
as out of scope of this work.
(3) Compute Mˆ ← Mark(M,mk): Computes the watermarked
model, by embedding the backdoors b.
(4) Output (M, Mˆ,mk,vk)
e verication of a watermark is performed by the algorithm
Veri f y(mk,vk,M). Veri f y takes as input the marking and veri-
cation keys and a model M , and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, indicating
whether the watermark is present in the model M or not. Formally,
Verify(mk, vk,M)
=
{
1, if
∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M,x) , TLx] − 1|L | |T | ≤ ϵ |T |
0, otherwise.
where [expr] is the indicator function that evaluates to 1 if expr is
true and 0 otherwise. Note that, as we skip the commitment details,
the marking keymk inVeri f y translates to the inputs x in the trig-
ger set T , and the verication key vk refers to the corresponding
labels TL . Furthermore, the 1|L | |T | comes from the assumption that
the ground-truth label is undened for the inputs of the trigger set
T , for which we assume the label is random. Hence, we assume
that for any x ∈ T , we have Pri ∈L[Classi f y(M,x) = i] = 1|L | . As a
result, it is expected that 1|L | |T | of the inputs fall into the backdoor
label “randomly”. Hence, to verify the presence of the watermark
in the model without a bias, we need to deduct this number from
the classication result.
3.3 Backdoor-based Watermarking Schemes
Backdoor-based watermarking schemes exploit the property of
over-parameterization in neural networks to embed backdoors in
them. ey teach the network a trigger set and its pre-dened (in-
correct) labels that will act as the embedded keys for the ownership
verication; it is necessary to note that the trigger set’s labels delib-
erately do not match the output of the ground truth function used
in the network training phase. We investigate the recent backdoor-
based schemes in [1, 16, 44]. e watermark embedded in these
schemes is one of the following three forms: Embedded Content,
Pre-Specied Noise, and Abstract Images.
a) Content Embedded(Logo): A visual marker(e.g. a text) is
added to a set of inputs, namely the training watermark
set, forming the owner’s signature and embedded in the
watermark model Mˆ . e text and its location is xed for
all the samples in the watermark set. en, these marked
inputs are matched to a xed label. e watermarked model
Mˆ , is expected to map any testing watermark set to that
xed class. A testing watermark set, is a set of inputs that
contains the same visual marker as the one embedded in
Mˆ . is approach is used in both [16] and [44].
b) Pre-Specied Noise: is watermark is similar to the logo
watermark in selection and classication process. e dif-
ference is what is added to the inputs is an instance of
Gaussian noise. e noise paern is xed for all samples
in the watermark set. is approach is one of the pro-
posed watermarking schemes in [44]. Note that in both
Pre-specied Noise and Content Embedded watermarking
schemes, there is just one label that the whole watermark
set is mapped to.
c) Abstract Images: In this category of watermarking, a set of
abstract images [1], or images that are not from the same
domain as the training data [44] is selected and labeled
with pre-dened classes. We continue with the Abstract
Images approach in [1]. e are two main dierences be-
tween this watermarking and the previous two. First, the
Abstract Images watermarking model Mˆ , maps dierent
subsets of the trigger set to dierent classes. Second, in
Abstract Images, unlike the previous two scheme the water-
mark is not a paern that is applicable to any input. Here,
watermark is a xed set of inputs and labels. Hence, the
testing watermark set is exactly the same as the training
watermark set.
3.4 Security of Backdoor-based Watermarking
We review the security claims in black-box watermarking as stated
in [1, 16, 44], and discuss how our aack invalidates all the pre-
sented claims. (i) As stated in [44], section 4: “Aer embedding(the
watermarks), the newly generated models are capable of ownership
verication. Once they are stolen and deployed to oer AI ser-
vice, owners can easily verify them by sending watermarks
as inputs and checking the service’s output.” (ii) As well, au-
thors in [1] claim that their proposed scheme is persistent in the
sense that “It is hard to remove a backdoor, unless one has
knowledge of the trigger set.” However, our aack shows that
the watermark is successfully removable and to perform so, the
aacker does not require any knowledge of the trigger set.
(iii) In addition to the security claims mentioned above, authors
in [1] make another claim on backdoor-based approaches while
denes persistency. Here is the claim: “let f be a ground-truth
function, b be a backdoor and Mˆ ← backdoor (Of ,b,M) be an
ϵ−accurate model. Assume an algorithm A on input Of , Mˆ out-
puts an ϵ−accurate model M˜ in time t , which is at least (1 − ϵ)
accurate on b. en N˜ ← A(Of ,N ) generated in the same time t ,
is also ϵ− accurate for any arbitrary model N ”. e claim, however
not supported with proofs, shows the impossibility of removing
the watermark while guarantees full access to the ground-truth
function and restricting the runtime of A. Authors in [1] state
the claim is also true in case of giving A unlimited power to A,
but restricting its access to the ground-truth function. Our aack
shows that this claim is not valid. In our model, A requires an
equivalent runtime of training a network but zero access to the
ground-truth function, and yet removes the watermark success-
fully while keeping the model ϵ−accurate. (iv) On a similar note
to [1], [16] claims that “transferring learning is on the same order
of magnitude as the cost of training, if not higher. With that much
resources and expertise at hand, an aacker would have built a
model on their own.” is claim clearly neglects the fact that the
cost of data preparation for the original model is comparable with
the cost of model generation itself, consequently the aacker saves
a considerable amount by stealing the model through queries. (iv)
[44] refer to the results of [39] to state that stealing a model using
prediction APIs needs queries of signicant size; e.g. 100k , where
k is the number of model parameters in the particular example of
two-layered neural network in [39]. ey conclude that as more
complicated models with more parameters, e.g. 138M in VGG-16,
the aack would even need considerably more queries. Our ex-
periments demonstrate that for a successful aack on a network
with more than a million of parameters, our aacker only needs to
query the API for 20000-30000 times. (v) Furthermore, [1] describes
their scheme to be functionality-preserving, providing unremov-
ability, unforgeability and enforcing non-trivial ownership. We
focus on the unremovability property that prevents an adversary
from removing a watermark, even if s/he knows about the exis-
tence of a watermark and the used algorithm. e unremovability
requires that for every PPT algorithmA the chance of winning the
following game is negligible:
(1) Compute (M, Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel
(2) Run A and compute M˜ ← A(Of , Mˆ,vk)
(3) A wins if:
Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x ,M) = f (x)]
≈ Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x , M˜) = f (x)]
and Veri f y(mk,vk, M˜) = 0
We propose a computationally boundedA which not only wins this
security game, but also demands fewer requirements. e algorithm
shown above is guaranteed access to the model and the ground-
truth function. Our aack however, only requires oracle access to
the model(Mˆ) parameters, public inputs D˜ from the domain and
none of the rest. Subsequently, it removes the watermark while it
preserves the functionality.
4 ATTACKS ON BACKDOOR-BASED
WATERMARKING
We introduce a black-box and a white-box aack on backdoor-based
watermarking in DNNs. Our black-box aack relies solely on the
model’s public information, mainly its query results. We also in-
troduce our white-box aack for scenarios that allow access to the
model parameters. Our white-box aack uses the model parameter
information to speed up and optimize the black-box aack. e
goal of our aacks is not only showing that the chance of winning
the unremovability game described in the previous section is not
negligible, but also exhibiting that doing so is possible with con-
siderably higher ecacy and less requirements than presented in
the game. We claim “less requirements”, since although the unre-
movability game permits the aacker algorithm A to know the
watermarking algorithm as well as to query the ground truth func-
tion f , neither of our aacks takes advantage of accessing the oracle
Of , nor they use any knowledge of the type of the watermarking
algorithm, e.g. Embedded Content or Pre-specied Noise. e game
as well, guarantees access to the model parameters by default. We
however, use this information only in our white-box aack. Our
black-box aack does not rely on any information of the model
parameters to remove the watermark. In addition to less require-
ments, we claim “higher ecacy”, as the unremovability game is
labeled as won if the aacker A suggests a model M˜ , such that the
model achieves a similar test accuracy as the watermarked model Mˆ
while: Veri f y(mk,vk, M˜) = 0. From the Veri f y description in the
previous section, the function outputs zero if the following holds:∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M˜,x) , TLx]− 1L |T | > ϵ |T |; meaning the number
of inputs in the trigger set mapped by M˜ to labels dierent than the
pre-dened labels exceeds a negligible fraction of the trigger set.
We go beyond this condition, and introduce the full removal of
the watermark, with the following two conditions:
(i) Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x ,M) = f (x)]
≈ Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x , M˜) = f (x)]
(ii)
∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M˜,x) = TLx] − 1L |T | ≤ ϵ |T |
In full removal of the watermark, the aacker’s proposed model
M˜ , still achieves a test accuracy very close to the watermarked
model Mˆ ’s. However, in this denition, the number of inputs in the
trigger set mapped by M˜ to the corresponding pre-dened labels
does not exceed a random labels assignment’s result by more than a
negligible fraction of the trigger set. We apply our aacks to three
dierent watermarking schemes introduced in [1, 16, 44]. In what
follows we introduce our aacks and show how they perform on
each watermarking scheme. We evaluate our aack on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 data sets.
4.1 Black-Box Attack
In our black-box aack, we do not assume any access to the trigger
set, the training data or the parameters of the watermarked model
Mˆ . Our aack solely relies on the publicized information. We query
the watermarked model Mˆ with input D˜ and use the query output
as data labels, to train a derived model as illustrated in Fig. 4. Note
that D˜ is distinct from the watermarked model Mˆ ’s training data D,
but is from the same application domain.
We show our aack model through the following black-box, full
watermark removal game. e OMˆ in the game indicates the black-
box access to Mˆ through a prediction API.
(1) Compute (M, Mˆ,T ,TL)← MModel()
(2) Run A and compute M˜ ← A(OMˆ )
(3) A wins if:
(i) Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x ,M) = f (x)]
≈ Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x , M˜) = f (x)]
(ii)
∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M˜,x) = TLx] − 1L |T | ≤ ϵ |T |
Figure 4: A schematic illustration of our black-box attack
As the rst step in the black-box, full watermark removal game,
MModel generates an original model M and forms the watermark
model Mˆ , by embedding backdoors b in it. It also generates the
trigger setT and its corresponding labelsTL . T can refer to a trigger
set that is either used in the training phase or the testing phase, or
a mixture of both. During the game, the aacker A is allowed to
make queries to Mˆ to train its model M˜ . e nal step in the game
is challenging the aacker A and evaluating if it can achieve the
same accuracy as the original model, while removing the watermark
fully.
4.2 White-Box Attack
e black-box aack we proposed in the previous section, does not
require any information about the model parameters. However,
we show that if the aacker A is guaranteed access to the model
parameters, as is the default assumption in the unremovability
game in [1], it can remove the watermark even more eciently. We
propose a white-box aack that provides our black-box aack with
signicant optimization. We show the white-box aack model by
the following white-box full watermark removal game.
(1) Compute (M, Mˆ,T ,TL)← MModel()
(2) Run A and compute M˜ ← A(Mˆ)
(3) A wins if:
(i) Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x ,M) = f (x)]
≈ Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x , M˜) = f (x)]
(ii)
∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M˜,x) = TLx] − 1L |T | ≤ ϵ |T |
Similar to the black-box full watermark removal game, MModel
generates an original M , the watermark model Mˆ , the trigger set
T and its corresponding labels TL . It allows the aacker A to
access Mˆ’s parameters to train its model M˜ . en A is challenged
to achieve the same accuracy as the original model, and remove
the watermark fully. Our white-box aack, illustrated in Fig. 5,
is inspired by the ne-pruning techniques introduced in [25]. It
consists of the two following sub algorithms: regularization and
ne-tuning.
(1) AReд(Mˆ,OMˆ ) → MˆReд
(2) AF ine (MˆReд ,OMˆ ) → M˜
e rst sub-algorithm AReд performs regularization on Mˆ . e
input for both sub-algorithms is D˜, which is from the same domain
as but distinct from D. e regularization algorithm adds a term
Figure 5: A schematic illustration of our white-box attack
to the residual sum of squares in the loss function. Since the co-
ecients are chosen to minimize the loss function, this technique
shrinks the coecient estimates towards zero. e general goal of
regularization is to discourage learning a more complex or exible
model, and to prevent overing [3]. In our aack, A deploys
AReд to remove the watermark fully. However, the achievement
costs a slight reduction in test accuracy compared to the original
model M . To compensate for this reduction, the output of AReд is
then fed to AF ine to be ne-tuned on an unmarked training set.
Fine-tuning is a strategy originally proposed in the context of trans-
fer learning [42], aiming to adapt a DNN trained for a particular
task to perform a related one. Fine-tuning initializes training with
the weights in MˆReд , and uses a small learning rate to generate the
model M˜ with nal weights that are relatively close to the weights
in MˆReд . Our results show that M˜ wins the white-box full water-
mark removal game described earlier; by satisfying both watermark
removal and accuracy maintenance requirements. We emphasize
that our white-box aack does not require any information of the
ground truth function or the trigger set for winning the game. In-
stead, it uses a random set of inputs from the domain and queries
the model Mˆ to label them.
4.3 Property Inference Attack
Property inference aacks [10] have been originally proposed to
extract knowledge about training data given whitebox access to a
neural network. We propose to use a property inference aack to
detect whether a backdooring-based watermark has been embed-
ded in a neural network that is highly accurate on some task. If
such an aack were successful, this classier could be used to check
whether a watermark removal aack is necessary and ultimately
if the model stealing aack has been successful. Moreover, this
classier could be hosted as a service by a third party to ease model
stealing aacks. In our aack, the aacker needs to have access
to an oracle Of , the backdoor-based watermark embedding func-
tion MModel and has to be able to generate k suciently dierent
high-accuracy models for f . In the following part we present the
watermark detection security game and subsequently describe and
perform an exemplary property inference aack on MNIST for all
three described watermarking schemes where the aacker wins
the watermark detection game.
Given a model Mˆ and an oracle Oд that correctly predicts whether a
model is watermarked, the aacker wins if he can design a classier
Mˆд that agrees for the classication of a given model with Oд with
a probability of at least 1 − ϵ . Figure 6 illustrates this watermark
detection game. Formally, A wins the watermark detection game
as following.
(1) Compute (M0,M1,mk,vk) ← MModel ()
(2) Sample b $←− {0, 1}
(3) Run A to compute Mˆд ← A(Of )
(4) A wins if Pr [Classi f y(Mb , Mˆд) = д(Mb )] ≈ 1 − ϵ
e cornerstone to the aack is the property inference algorithm
which extracts a set of labeled feature vectors from a non-watermarked
model M and its watermarked counterpart Mˆ . e binary label de-
notes whether the feature vector was extracted from M or Mˆ . Given
suciently many training examples, the intuition is to generate a
feature space that is clearly separable between the two classes. e
feature extraction algorithm has access to the oracle Of so that
even elaborate features such as benign mean activations could be
included. We chose to implement a property inference aack on
MNIST as a demonstration that the aack works. In the discus-
sion we give an intuition on why the aack should generally work
for any other backdoor-based watermarking scheme. For MNIST,
the feature vectors are generated simply by extracting weights
and biases from the rst layer and computing the mean activa-
tion on benign input for each layer. is method is referred to as
FeatureExtract(M,x) where M is the input model and x is part of
the benign training data. Next, we introduce the function PIData
which generates the training data by extracting features from the
non-watermarked M and its watermarked counterpart Mˆ .
PIData():
(1) Generate (M, Mˆ,mk,vk) ← MModel ()
(2) Extract FM = FeatureExtract(M,x)
(3) Extract FMˆ = FeatureExtract(Mˆ,x)
(4) Output FM , FMˆ
Each invocation of PIData requires that the aacker generates a
new high-accuracy model on the task f . e actual aack PIAttack
generates training and testing data and stops training the binary
classier Mˆд once the testing accuracy is suciently high.
PIAttack():
(1) Generate (Dtrain ,Dtest ) ← ⋃
i=1..k
PIData()
(2) Compute Mˆд ← Train(Dtrain )
(3) Stop when PrF ∈Dtest [Classi f y(F , Mˆд) = д(F )] ≈ 1 − ϵ
(4) Output Mˆд
e property inference aack serves as a model for future aacks
that - given the exibility of the denition, entails approaches like
those presented in [41]. In the experiments section, we demonstrate
that the presented watermarking schemes are vulnerable to the
property inference aack. We show this by executing the PIAttack
algorithm to accurately classify watermarked models for MNIST.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We rst explain the experiment setup and evaluation metrics. en
present our results of aacking various categories of backdoor-
based watermarking, using our black-box and white-box algorithms.
Figure 6: A schematic illustration of our property inference
attack.
Subsequently we discuss that the results conrm our claim that our
aacks can fully remove the watermarks. We should also mention
that since we are simulating both the challenger and the aacker
in our experiments and do not allow any overlap in their training
dataset, our models eectively have access to half of the training
dataset. e limitation prevents our models from reaching their
highest possible accuracy [43]. Despite the fact that our aacks
reach their best performance when applied to original models with
high accuracy, as we discuss in 5.3, they can still remove the em-
bedded watermark successfully in our experiments. e results are
publicly veriable with our code available at [blinded for review].
5.1 Experiment Setup
In the previous section, we introduced our aack model through a
full watermark removal game between a challenger MModel and
the aacker A. We simulate both entities in this section and run
experiments according to the algorithm descriptions in Section 4.
Original andWatermarkedModelGeneration-We rst sim-
ulate the MModel algorithm in our full watermark removal games
to generate the original model M , the watermarked model Mˆ , and
the watermark consisting of the watermark test set T and its cor-
responding labels TL . e model M is trained over a portion of
the training data with ground truth labels and we use the rest for
testing. We capture the model’s ability in correctly classifying the
test set, namely test accuracy, as our rst evaluation metric. For
backdoor-based watermarking schemes, we investigate the three
watermark constructions i) Content Embedded, ii) Pre-Specied
Noise, and iii) Abstract Images as described in 3.1. We explain
Figure 7: Samples of watermarks embedded byMModel
(a)Content Embedded (b)Gaussian Noise (c)Abstract Images
how MModel embeds each scheme. For Content Embedded([44]
and [16]), MModel rst takes a subset of the training data with
labels equally distributed over all classes to form the watermark
set. We point to the rest of the training set as the remaining train-
ing set. Subsequently, MModel embeds a content in the form of a
text (TEST) inside a 26x10 square in all images in the watermark
set. e watermark’s position is xed but initially selected ran-
domly, the corresponding label of the watermark set is also selected
randomly among the L valid labels of the training set. Fig. 7 (a)
shows a sample of the watermark set MModel generated for embed-
ding content in MNIST data. To deploy Pre-specied Noise as the
watermark([44]), MModel embeds an instance of Gaussian noise in
the watermark set, as shown through a sample in Fig. 7 (b). Selec-
tion of the watermark set for Pre-specied Noise is the same as the
process in Content Embedded watermarking. However, in Abstract
Images([1] and [44]), the watermark set is generated dierently. In
this scheme, the watermark set is a set of abstract unrelated 100
images, as shown through an example in Fig. 7 (c), additional to the
training data. is watermark set in Abstract Images is then, unlike
the previous two watermark sets, divided into L trigger sets and
each set is mapped to a distinct label. Aer forming the watermark
set for the watermarking scheme, MModel generates the water-
mark model Mˆ . To do so, MModel trains a model Mˆ with a portion
the of the watermark set and a portion of the remaining training
set. Note that the rest of the two sets is needed to form test set
and watermark test set. We evaluate the model Mˆ , by capturing its
ability in correctly classifying the test set, namely test accuracy and
its ability in correctly recognizing the watermark and classifying it
according to the pre-dened label in the watermark test set, namely
watermark retention.
Attack Algorithm A and Generating M˜- In both our black-
box and white-box aacks, the algorithmA aims to derive a model
M˜ that keeps the same test accuracy as the original model M , while
it reduces the watermark retention to 1|L | , where |L| is the total
number of valid classes. is reduction, shows that the model
associates the watermarked input to the pre-dened class, not more
than a random classier would do, hence indicating success in
removing the watermark fully. To generate M˜ , neither of our aacks
use the original model M’s training data with the ground truth
labels, nor any of the watermarking information. Instead, they
both query the watermark model Mˆ with inputs from the publicly
known domain of Mˆ . Provided with the corresponding labels by
Mˆ , the aacker trains M˜ . e model M˜ is initiated with random
weights when trained during the black-box aack, but is initiated
with the weights of Mˆ in the white-box aack. ere are more
details in training M˜ during white-box aack. Aer M˜ is initiated
with the parameters of Mˆ , it undergoes a regularization process
and then is ne-tuned with the inputs from the publicly known
domain of Mˆ .
Data Sets for Experiments- We evaluate our aacks over two
popular data sets in DNN literature: MNIST and CIFAR-10. MNIST
has 60K training images and 10K test images. Cifar has 50K training
images and 10K test images. We split the training data in half for
the aacker and owner. Our mini-batches contain 64 elements
and we use the SGD-based optimizing strategy RMSProp [3] with
learning rate of 0.001. While training any model, we use Early
Stopping [3] on the training accuracy with a min-delta of 0.1% and
a patience of 2. For the white-box aack we use early stopping on
the watermark retention with a baseline of 0.1 a patience of 2 for
Embedded Content and Pre-specied Noise watermarking schemes
and 0 for Abstract Images. We use 0-1 normalization [3] for all
datasets.
Security and Performance Evaluation- In what follows, we
present our black-box and white-box aack with concrete param-
eters in their setup and evaluation. As mentioned earlier in this
section, our security evaluation metrics are: test accuracy and wa-
termark retention. Test accuracy, is model’ ability to correctly
classify unseen input. Similarly, watermark retention is the model’s
ability to classify a marked input into pre-dened labels. We also
evaluate the performance of our aacks, based on the time they take
to run rather than the number of epochs. As the laer is depends
on the model while the former is independent of it.
5.2 Results
We present the results of our experiments black-box aack on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. For
both data sets, we evaluate our aacks on each of the three wa-
termarking schemes described in 3.3, namely: Embedded Content
(a,b), Pre-specied Noise (c,d) and Abstract Images (e, f ). e sub-
gures (a), (c) and (e) depict the black-box aack results, and the
subgures (b), (d) and (f ) indicate the white-box aack results on
the corresponding data set. Each graph evaluates the models gener-
ated by algorithm MModel followed byA’s evaluations, where the
former represents the owner’s watermarked model and the laer
represents the aacker’s model. Note that to have fair evaluations
we use the same network architecture for MModel andA. e eval-
uation metrics in our experiments are test accuracy and watermark
retention. While both schemes desire a good test accuracy, in wa-
termark retention they have opposite goals. e goal of the owner’s
model is to keep the watermark retention as close as possible to 1,
whereas the aacker’s model aims to remove the watermark fully,
hence desiring a watermark retention that represents a value no
more than a random label assignment algorithm would do, i.e. 1L .
As shown in black-box aack graphs, (a), (c) and (e), the aacker
A starts training its model M˜ , when MModel is done training the
watermark model Mˆ . A initiates training from random weights
and queries Mˆ for labeling its input to train the model aerwards.
e graphs indicate how long the black-box aack takes to train M˜
compared to the time MModel needs to spend to train Mˆ . In both
models, the training continues until its test accuracy is stable at a
desired level.
For the white-box aack on the other hand, subgures (b), (d) and
(f ),A initiates the algorithm from MModel parameters in addition
to requiring Mˆ labeling its inputs. A rst goes through a regular-
ization phase over a fraction of training data for M˜ that takes a
short time compared to the model’s training time. As perceived
from the graphs, A continues regularization until the watermark
retention reaches a low level. Aerwards, A applies a ne-tuning
algorithm over the rest of M˜’s training data to compensate for the
drop in test accuracy. e ne-tuning continues until M˜ hits a sta-
ble interval that is ϵ-close to the Mˆ ′s test accuracy. Our black-box
aack applied to models with watermarking schemes of Embedded
Content, Pre-specied Noise, and Abstract Images on MNIST data,
Fig. 8(a), (c), (e) respectively, reduces the watermark retention is
successfully from nearly 100% in the watermarked model Mˆ to less
(a) Black-box Attack, Embedded Content, MNIST (b) White-box Attack, Embedded Content, MNIST
(c) Black-box Attack, Pre-specied Noise, MNIST (d) White-box Attack, Pre-specied Noise, MNIST
(e) Black-box Attack, Abstract Images, MNIST (f) White-box Attack, Embedded Content, MNIST
Figure 8: Experiment results on MNIST for various backdoor-based watermarking schemes: (a,b) Embedded Content, (c,d)
Pre-specied Noise, (e,f) Abstract Images, where (a), (c), (e) represent black-box attack results and (b), (d), (f) demonstrate the
white-box attack results
than 10%(9.6%, 8.5%, 8.6%) while it causes a negligible drop in test
accuracy(0.3%, 0.2%, 0.3%). e performance of the aack is compa-
rable to the performance of the watermarked model(since we do not
consider the extensive data preparation step for the watermarked
model). e watermarked model takes 3.5, 2.6 and 2.6 minutes to
train with the three mentioned watermarking schemes embedded,
whilst our black-box aack takes 3.6, 4.1 and 5 minutes correspond-
ingly to remove the watermark. e white-box aack graphs in
Fig. 8(b), (d), (f) demonstrate signicant speed-up compared to the
black-box results. To remove the watermark while reaching the
same test accuracy as our black-box aack, the white-box aack
takes only 0.59, 0.77 and 2.1 minutes. However, we noticed that by
continuing training the model in the white-box aack for a total
time of 3.3, 3, 3.8 minutes for each watermarking scheme, we can
even reach higher test accuracy values, i.e. 0.1% drop compared to
the watermark model Mˆ .
We evaluated our aacks on CIFAR-10 data as well. Fig. 9 (a), (c), and
(e) show the results of our black-box aack on Embedded Content,
Pre-specied Noise, and Abstract Images watermarking respec-
tively, while subgures (b), (d) and (f) indicate the corresponding
(a) Black-box Attack, Embedded Content, CIFAR-10 (b) White-box Attack, Embedded Content, CIFAR-10
(c) Black-box Attack, Pre-specied Noise, CIFAR-10 (d) White-box Attack, Pre-specied Noise, CIFAR-10
(e) Black-box Attack, Abstract Images, CIFAR-10 (f) White-box Attack, Abstract Images, CIFAR-10
Figure 9: Experiment results on CIFAR-10 for various backdoor-based watermarking schemes: (a,b) Embedded Content, (c,d)
Pre-specied Noise, (e,f) Abstract Images, where (a), (c), (e) represent black-box attack results and (b), (d), (f) demonstrate the
white-box attack results
results achieved by our white-box aack. e results show that
our black-box aack reduces the watermark retention from nearly
100% in the watermarked model Mˆ to 8.1%, 3.4%, and 20% in M˜ . e
training time for Mˆ is 166, 178 and 112 minutes, whereas it takes the
black-box aack 244, 208, and 158 minutes to train M˜ . e required
time could signicantly be dropped to 20, 20, and 33 minutes by
our white-box aack for the same accuracy. However, aiming for
higher accuracy is also possible through our white-box aack since
it results in 1%, 0.4%, and 0.9% test accuracy if it is permied to
train for 150, 123, and 190 minutes for each watermarking scheme.
Property Inference Attack- We investigated the eectiveness
of our property inference aack to distinguish watermarked models
from unmarked ones as shown in Fig. 10 (a) and (b). In (a) we trained
a two-layer model MP I by using 294 watermarked and unmarked
models. e watermarked models were marked using Embedded
Content method, and the tested MP I on 33 models and the result
is shown in Fig. 10. e network classies watermarked and un-
marked models perfectly aer only 50 seconds of training. We
repeated the experiment on models with Pre-specied Noise water-
marking in (b). Aer training for 3.5 seconds with 113 watermarked
and unmarked models, our 2-layer model performs perfect classi-
cation. We leave further investigation of the probable reasons to
the discussion.
5.3 Discussion
We provide further analysis of our aacks here and compare our
work with the only other aack to backdoor-based watermarking
schemes. We as well investigate deeper and present evidences that
backdoor watermarking the model contradicts it achieving higher
classication accuracy.
Full Removal of Watermark- As dened in Section 4, full
watermark removal is achieved if the following two conditions are
satised
(i) Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x ,M) = f (x)]
≈ Prx ∈D [Classi f y(x , M˜) = f (x)]
(ii)
∑
x ∈T [Classi f y(M˜,x) = TLx] − 1L |T | ≤ ϵ |T |
Our black-box aack removes the watermark with maximum ϵ =
0% and ϵ = 20% for MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively, with corre-
sponding test accuracy drop of M˜ compared to Mˆ is at maximum
0.3% and 3.7%. e aack takes up to almost twice as much time as
the watermarked model training. We demonstrated the results of
our black-box aack in combination with our proposed white-box
aack. e white-box aack introduces two advantages over the
black-box one. First, it removes the watermark while achieving
the same accuracy as the black-box aack in considerably shorter
time. It does so with maximum ϵ = 1.4% for MNIST and ϵ = 13%
for CIFAR-10. Second, it can achieve higher accuracy(0.1% drop for
MNIST and 1% drop for CIFAR) if trained for longer.
Comparison with Evasion attack- ere has been just one
other aack in DNN watermarking literature to remove backdoors
[20], which steals n models and collects responses from all of them
for each query. It then selects the answer that receives a higher vote
among the responds from the stolen networks, and provides that
as API prediction. e evasion aack has various disadvantages.
First, it relies on accessing n models that perform the same task. It
is also introduced as an online aack which requires availability
of all n models for API prediction. Finally, it does not support
any upgrade. In contrast, our aack does not require access to
multiple networks to aack a watermarked network. We just query
the target model for limited number of times, until we train our
substitute model. Moreover, our substitute model can adapt to a
more optimized version if it acquires more information, i.e. the
watermarked model’s parameters.
Watermark retention and test accuracy- In addition to the
successful watermark removal by our aacks, we observed another
important result in our experiments. As depicted in Fig. 11 for
both MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets in (a) and (b), our aacks
on watermarked model Mˆ reach lower watermark retention if Mˆ
achieves higher test accuracy. e reason is, the watermarked
model Mˆ is the reference for M˜’s learning. If Mˆ does not achieve
high accuracy, the inadequacy transfers to M˜ as well. Subsequently
side factors would play a more important role in classifying the
watermark test rather than the accurate model. We give an example
of these “side factors” to clarify our argument. Considering the
Content Embedded watermarking scheme, we know that the all
elements in the watermark set, which has the size of 10% of the
training data, are mapped to a pre-dened xed class, e.g. class
is 2. On the other hand, in classifying the rest of the training
data we expect a balanced coverage of the labels, i.e. each label
is mapped to approximately 10% of the training data. Now, the
class 2 is mapped to 20% of the training data in total, resulting in
an overall unbalanced class coverage. As a result, if a model Mˆ
trained on this data is not accurate enough, it will carry the bias
in classications and transfers the bias to the subsequent network,
M˜ as well. erefore, M˜ is more resistant to watermark removal.
Hence, what is implied in this observation is for a model to maintain
higher watermark retention, it is encouraged to provide lower
classication accuracy. is inherent contradiction impedes the
backdoor-based watermarking schemes to fulll their claim on
the possibility of maintaining a high test accuracy and watermark
retention at the same time.
Property Inference Attack- We demonstrated earlier that our
property inference aack is capable of distinguishing the presence
of a watermark in a given network. We provide further evidences
in Fig. 12 to present the rational behind it. Fig. 12 indicates feature
vectors for watermarked models(dashed line) and unmarked mod-
els(solid line). Fig. 12 (a) shows the weight average in the rst layer
of networks watermarked by Embedded Content approach and
their dierence with the weight averages of an unmarked model.
As well, Fig. 12 (b) indicates the dierence in the rst layer biases
of unmarked models and models watermarked with Pre-specied
Noise. Adding the capability of detecting watermarks empowers
our black-box and white-box aacks even more. First, for it enables
them to target only the watermarked models. Second, it helps the at-
tacks to perform more eciently and accurately by providing them
with a tool to distinguish the stopping point, instead of continuing
training blindly for a xed period of time.
6 CONCLUSION
We presented three aacks on the recent backdoor-based water-
marking schemes in deep neural networks; black-box aack, white-
box aack, and property inference aack. e targeted schemes
deploy the model’s watermark in one the form of: logo devised
by an embedded content, pre-specied noise paern or trigger
set consisting of abstract images. Our black-box and white-box
aacks neither requires information about the type of embedded
watermark, nor they need access to the ground truth function of
the watermarked model, saving on enormous amount of time and
resources required to prepare the training data. Instead, our aacks
solely rely on the results of querying the watermarked model to
label arbitrary inputs from the publicly known domain of the wa-
termarked model. We should as well mention that since the total
number of queries in either of our aacks in only 20, 000 − 30, 000,
it is dicult for the watermarked model to rely on approaches
such as rate limiting to defend against them. We show that our
aacks successfully remove the model watermark completely, with
no sacrice on classication accuracy of the model. Our black-box
approach, is a surrogate model aack that accomplishes the full
watermark removal task while knowing none of the watermarked
model parameter and by solely exploiting its publicly available
information. Although we show that granting more information,
e.g. watermark model’s parameters, facilitates devising a more
(a) Embedded Content (b) Pre-specied Noise
Figure 10: Property inference attack and watermark detection
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR
Figure 11: Watermark retention versus test accuracy of the watermarked model Mˆ for (a) MNIST and (b) CIFAR
optimized aack. We introduced our white-box aack in this work
which consists of regularization and ne-tuning processes and im-
proves the black-box aack’s performance noticeably. In addition
to our two watermark removal aacks, we proposed a property
inference aack that can distinguish a watermarked model from an
unmarked one. is aack provides us with a powerful tool, to rst
recognize watermarked models and then apply our black-box or
white-box aacks on. Second, it benets our aacks by conrming
when the watermark is fully removed and allows seing an accurate
stop time to further improve our aacks’ eciency.
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